20010322:
  - Protect against the Czech attack of modified secret key files. (Cool!)
  - Protect against MPI computing errors. (more programm errors than Bellcore)

20001006:
  - Alter the ARJ signature to the current version.
  - Prevent automatic renaming of command line arguments
    used for file names (+batchmode).

199990902:
  - Up to 32bit KeyID can be selected.
  - Allow batchmode to revoke certificates (and keys :-{).

199971007:
  - Bugfix of the previous bugfix. I'm an idiot unable to program in C.
  - language.txt (German part) brushed up.

199971006:
  - Bugfix of ordinary PGP: -kc failed to deal correctly w/ DSS signatures.

199970905:
  - Bugfix: Compile under MSDOS and OSF.
  - Corrected some spelling errors.
  - ESC is plain text, too.
  - Somewhat more verbose output.
  - 8192 bit RSA support

199970828:
  - Certificates of unknown pubkeys are suppressed.
    (New Option UNKNOWN_CERTS (On/Off))
  - pgp -kvv shows the quality of user identification.

199970729:
  - Bugfix: Validity period is read correctly from the key ring.

199970529:
  - Certificates from revoked keys are invalid.

199970513:
  - Certificates from unknown users are handled correctly.

199970512:
  - Certificate revocations are correctly handled and displayed.

199970418:
  - support of a separate "encrypt to self" id
  - certificates signed with compromised keys are invalid now
  - support of certificate revocation certificates:
    You can revoke your ID without loosing your key.

199970404:
  - try the corresponding key, if the key of the wrong purpose is used,
    so 'pgp -se file myname -u myname' will automatically choose the right
    keys.
  - SIGN keys can be used to decrypt, but PGP will warn the user.
  - The language modul could not distinguish two strings, so changed them.
  - Recommendations for key generating changed: Larger keys, userid options.

199970403:
  - 2.6.3ia patch included
  - bugfixes

199970402:
  - While certifying a key the certifier can specify how (s)he checked
    the user's real identity. (This question is quite different to
    the question whether the key was presented by this person or not!)
  - SIGN keys cannot encrypt.
  - SIGN keys cannot decrypt (so you can't read it!)
  - ENCR keys cannot sign or certify.
  - Signatures or certificates by ENCR keys are invalid. (even self signed)
  - Signatures or certificates are invalid, if their timestamp is not covered
    by the validity period of the public key. (too young or too old)
  - Expired keys are kept but marked. (same for keys valid in future)
  - Purpose and expire of a key are set while generating the key.
    It is derived from the userid as described in the policy of the IN-CH.

References:
  http://www.in-ca.individual.net/
  ftp://ftp.iks-jena.de/pub/mitarb/lutz/crypt/software/pgp/
    Diffs and full source (tgz)
    *.asc are detached signatures.

Contributors:
  Matthias Bruestle for the myetsid feature.
  Lutz Donnerhacke for the pgp2.6.3in development.
  Ingmar Camphausen, Thomas Roessler, a.o. for extensive testing.

Todo:
  - New trust models for revoked certificates.
  - Time stamping features (using the Eternity Logfile:
                            http://www.iks-jena.de/mitarb/lutz/logfile/)
  - Support of EBP and PGP5.0 features.
  - Better internal key management for faster access.
  - Direct support for keyserver issues.